“Decentralization” of income per capita and its relationship to administrative decentralization in the context of European Union members by Benos, Christos et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
“Decentralization” of income per capita
and its relationship to administrative
decentralization in the context of
European Union members
Christos Benos and Ioanna Angelopoulou and Theodore
Metaxas
Department of Informatics, Athens University of Economics and
Business, Athens, Greece, Department of Planning and Regional
Development, University of Thessaly, Volos, Greece, Department of
Economics, University of Thessaly, Volos, Greece
2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/78777/
MPRA Paper No. 78777, posted 25 April 2017 16:54 UTC
 “DECENTRALIZATION” OF INCOME PER CAPITA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO 
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN 
UNION MEMBERS 
 
Benos Christosa, Angelopoulou Ioannab, Metaxas Theodorec 
 
a Department of Informatics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece, 
benos@uth.gr  
b Department of Planning and Regional Development, University of Thessaly, Volos, Greece, 
ioangelo@uth.gr   
c Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, Volos, Greece, metaxas@econ.uth.gr  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this research we tried to define, for the first time, the concept of "decentralization" 
of per capita income and its position among other constructions, similar to or 
associated with it. In this direction, we tried to give decentralization a definition as 
clear as possible, using existing concepts to identify it, but also to associate it with its 
most likely cause, administrative decentralization. Besides the theoretical 
documentation we, additionally, attempted to put this relationship under an 
econometric test, which indicates some trends but, because of the difficulties in 
measuring some variables, we were not able to extract absolutely reliable 
conclusions. 
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1. Introduction 
Dealing with the concept of decentralization as a mechanism for the 
transformation of society is not an unprecedented idea, but it has its roots in the 19th 
century, as reported by Cohen et al, as cited in Parker (1995), and the argument 
between the value of a centralized (Dupont -White) versus a decentralized state 
(Lemennais). In the second half of the 20th century, almost every country has 
experimented with some form of decentralization or reform of their local 
governments, in order to achieve various objectives and effects (Cheema & 
Rondinelli (1983) - review of the decentralization of the 1970s, Campbell et al. 1991 
- Review of the recent experience in Latin America). 
One of the most important trends of the European Union, in recent years, is the 
interest in administrative decentralization. Except for the federalization of the Union 
which became a tighter structure, as an organization, which has been completed 
and it constantly deepens, EU member states delegate more and more authorities to 
the decentralized subnational governments. This process has been linked, by many 
scientists, to the effectiveness and to the confrontation of regional disparities, as it is 
being discussed below. 
Without being willing to judge, to replace or to substitute the value of this 
relationship, we start under the assumption that decentralized management may be 
more likely to lead to a decentralization of per capita income than to achieve tackling 
inequality between regions, which, according to Salmon (2009), is a key parameter 
of decentralization and federalism in several European countries. 
In the following sections, we will examine the basis and the theoretical 
foundation of this relationship, according to the existing literature (Sections 2 and 3). 
Moreover, in sections 4 and 5, we will search for statistical elements that will express 
these concepts as variables and we will try to find out if this relationship could be 
econometrically confirmed. Finally, we present our conclusions and especially the 
prospects for improving the documentation of this relationship. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Previous studies: object - methods - results 
 
In this section, we will attempt to cite and briefly describe previous studies 
carried out on the matter we discuss. Although we find no literature references 
precisely on decentralization of per capita GDP, we will deal with studies which 
either examine its unequal distribution between the regions of countries, or 
investigate the forms and the causes of administrative decentralization and, also, 
other alternative methods of measuring them. 
In recent years, it has been observed that almost all countries have made some 
effort in order to achieve some kind of restructuring of their local government. Also, 
an increase in privatization of tradable services has been found, while a NGO 
development has taken place too (Parker, 1995). 
Fortunately, in European Union, no extreme differences between the capitals 
and other regions have been noticed, as happens in other parts of the world. 
However, there exist some imbalances and, thus, it deserves to be studied in terms 
of its decentralization. 
The most frequently used terminology to discuss decentralization is the one 
proposed by Rondinelli (1981), as cited in Parker (1995), which distinguishes four 
different categories of decentralization: (i) administrative decentralization, (ii) 
representative decentralization, (iii) transfers decentralization and (iv) privatization (a 
wider meaning of decentralization according to Matsui, 2005). 
During decentralization, human communities and public services manage 
themselves under state control and power, while they are provided the necessary 
resources (Andronic 2012). Essentially, each local government undertakes a number 
of responsibilities, which require the implementation of a separate budget (Gyorgy & 
Campeanu 2009). 
This phenomenon is particularly strong and brisk, when in situations of economic 
and political crisis, while it is regarded as a measure of democratic reform, after the 
collapse of centralized systems, while in other countries administrative 
decentralization or federalism have a long tradition (Balisacan et al. 2006). 
 4 
 
 In order to immunize the discussion’s quality, it would be helpful to highlight that 
we do not fully employ, but we cite the finding of Oprea (2010), that federalization 
and decentralization are legally but not financially differentiated. 
It is, therefore, common knowledge that most countries, including economically 
developed, face regional disparities and, therefore, they implement strategies and 
policies for regional development. But, it should be noticed that the difficulties arising 
from regional imbalances and the possibilities of solving them cannot be determined, 
without taking into account the general level of development in each country 
(Humplick & Moini-Araghi, 1996). 
As highlighted in Balisacan et al. (2006), the centrally planned regional 
development efforts have usually failed, while local communities consider capitals 
(decision-making centers) as corrupted, authoritarian, arrogant and distant, 
especially in countries which are internally diversified and large1 (Balisacan et al. 
2006). That is why we are looking especially at per capita GDP’s "decentralization" 
and not (as common) at regional inequality. 
Initially, according to Bird and Villaincourt (1998:1) as cited in Balisacan et al. 
(2006), decentralization is neither a plague nor panacea. However, the relationship 
between regional development and local autonomy and decentralization, mainly 
administrative, is highlighted (Andronic, 2012). So, it seems to be a generally 
accepted position that the policy of competition between regions on tax and on 
provided services and the proximity of the decision-making to stakeholders, which 
decentralization causes, is particularly favorable in almost all sectors2. Although 
these assumptions are supported by the observed correlation between the degree of 
decentralization and economic development, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) 
argue that this is not interpreted and justified sufficiently yet (Balisacan et al. 2006; 
Cirnu 2010). 
Public services are closer to citizens and to the resources while any tax (income) 
is transferred to the authority which is able to manage them more effectively 
(Andronic 2012). In Europe, the potential management of European funds at 
regional level is highlighted (Popescu & Enescu 2013). Finally, in a decentralized 
context, financial competition limits the government's ability to extract fees, 
                                                 
1 Large meaning: covering a wide area. 
2 Except for legal, macroeconomic, foreign and defense policy. 
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enhancing, thereby, economic efficiency and, thus, economic growth (Lessmann 
2011). 
Conversely, sometimes administrative decentralization limits fiscal capacity of 
central government to intervene in order to reduce disparities by investing in national 
infrastructure to remove internal barriers. Of course, a key role is played by 
coordination (vertical and horizontal) between individual governments and 
governance quality. 
Another problem has to do with subnational government revenue. Many times, 
they are reluctant themselves to increase their tax revenue, because of political 
reasons, while (central) government tries to find ways to delay or reduce payments 
to them (Balisacan et al. 2006). Furthermore, it limits the possibility of asserting 
countercyclical policies (Ter-Minassian 1997a), because center is being deprived of 
some taxes and expenditure (Tanzi 1995) and subnational governments usually 
carry out pro-cyclical policies (Tanzi 2000; IMF 2009 in Eyraud et al. 2012). 
Moreover, mistakes that lead to a reduction of the beneficial effects of 
decentralization, such as failure to provide services due to the insufficient transfer of 
powers, the lack of clarity and transparency of regulations, the narrow margin for the 
financial management of local resources and transfers, need to be avoided (Dragan 
& Gogonea 2009). 
Other researchers highlight the beneficial effect of an active civil society, such as 
Putnam (1993). Finally, an essential element is an accountability and punishment 
system (Parker 1995). 
Considering European Union over the last three decades, we observe a clear 
policy for an effective decentralization of state governments (Patonov 2013). Of 
course, in European Union diversification between countries, according to the extent 
and the form of decentralization is remarkably high, concerning both distribution of 
revenue (volume and origin) and expenditure as long as legislative authorities 
between government levels (Dragan & Gogonea 2009; Eyraud et al. 2012). 
Therefore, the term regionalization and the term region cover political and 
administrative realities that are extremely different in European countries (different 
kind of regions in each country) (Popescu & Enescu 2013). Similarly, the relationship 
between central government and subnational governments varies. 
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Coordinating, European Commission has developed the concept of regional 
policy, considering it as an investment policy form. Via investments it enhances 
competitiveness, economic development, job creation and it also improves quality of 
life and sustainable development highlighting the solidarity between countries and 
regions of EU, while it is believed that resources are allocated where they can 
produce the greatest possible improvement (Andronic 2012). 
Using cross-section and panel data for 23 OECD countries from 1982 to 2000, 
Lessmann’s (2011) work empirically studies the effect of fiscal decentralization on 
regional disparities. It considers that a higher degree of decentralization is related to 
a reduction of regional disparities. 
Other studies show that whether decentralization is good or bad for equality is 
highly dependent on the level of development of a region. There are several reasons 
for that, such as limited budgets of poorest countries and the transfers’ dependence 
on richest regions or state (Oates 2008). It seems, therefore, that there is a 
"minimum level of economic development", in which fiscal decentralization becomes 
attractive (Oates 2008) and it becomes more likely to yield reduction of inequality 
(Pike et. al. 2011). 
Moreover, there are many empirical studies examining the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and economic growth, but their results are somewhat 
confusing (Lessmann 2011). The main causes for such an image are: 
1) The different models of decentralization among the analyzed countries, 
2) The different levels of income, 
3) The low explanatory power of regression models, 
4) The omission of many variables in the regressions, 
5) The existence of statistically insignificant regression coefficients and the   
different signs of these coefficients (Patonov 2013). 
In general, we could conclude that the expenditure decentralization model in EU 
is efficient and successful. It helps to increase the efficiency of public sector and it 
accelerates economic growth of member states. The question about the optimum 
degree of fiscal decentralization for each country remains under discussion and 
depends on their macroeconomic peculiarities (Patonov 2013). 
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One last important contribution of the existing literature to our research is the 
identification of appropriate measures for administrative decentralization. Fiscal 
decentralization is usually measured by the ratio of local government revenue in 
general government revenue or their corresponding expenditure. Expenditure is 
preferred because the justification of most cases is based on arguments related to 
expenditure and not to revenue creation. Also, using expenditure ensures 
comparability of results with those of previous studies. However, the case in which 
decisions are taken by the central government, but they are executed by sub-
national governments is usual (Oates, 1972) and, therefore, some implement 
decentralization measures based only on subnational governments revenue 
(Rodden 2004; Stegarescu 2005 in Lessmann 2011). Finally, a rather critical level of 
“high-quality institutions” ensures an efficient allocation of scarce resources between 
sectors, which could, perhaps, explain a possible failure of us to observe a 
correlation between the variables (Chanda & Dalgaard, 2003). 
 
2.2 Bibliography gap and reasons why it exists 
 
What we observed throughout the whole literature is the absence of an 
investigation on or even a reference to the relationship that may exist between 
administrative decentralization and GDP p.c. decentralization. Particular emphasis 
has been laid upon the effort to link administrative decentralization to growth of a 
country as a whole and, to some extent, to the economic convergence of regions 
within a country. 
Even on these issues, however, that theoretical analysis considered as 
completely logical and expected, there is no sufficient confirmation based on 
empirical studies. On the one hand, data are limited. On the other hand, choosing a 
model and the appropriate variables requires brave (and therefore risky) 
assumptions. 
Another extension, that would worth some research, but there exist insufficient 
data is the effect, if any, of decentralization processes in interpersonal inequalities. 
However, our knowledge about it, is very limited and fragmented (Pike et. al. 2011). 
Why income distribution inequality is investigated while income distribution 
decentralization is not? Perhaps, among other reasons, it is due to the objective that 
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is set by European Union to reduce the significant economic, social and territorial 
"inequalities" that still exist between Europe's regions (Andronic 2012). 
 
3. Research Purpose 
This research has been created to complete the prospective effects of 
decentralization of administration in the economy, using a new concept: 
decentralization of income distribution. 
3.1  The bibliographic gap - definition of the 
investigated relationship of space and time 
As it has been extensively discussed in Section 2, the bibliographic gap is 
identified, in our opinion, in the space in between the surveys that had been already 
conducted. On the one hand, the impact of decentralization on the overall growth of 
a country, which applies it, has been studied (not leading to undeniable conclusions 
yet). On the other hand, the effect of decentralization of administration in inequality-
convergence of regional income, has also been examined, mainly in theory and 
always leading to confused empirical results, depending on the country used in each 
case study (essentially studies aim to find out if the poorest regions are being 
favored or the income gap grows). 
We will focus on another income gap, the one between the capital city (which is 
considered as the central decision-making core) and the rest of the country. We 
don’t assume that decentralized power will necessarily be in favor of poorer regions, 
but that it will cease to be "biased" in favor of the core of centralized management, 
the capital city. We expect that the multi-central government would be able to bring 
about a "more polycentric" economy. Thus, we examine whether decentralization of 
administration leads to a decentralization of GDP. 
Decentralization of development, which we are considering at this paper, could 
be also described as a form of dualism (if we widen the narrow definition of 
polarization between agricultural and industrial sector) between the center and 
periphery, as reported by Kanbur & Mclntosh (1988), but in an interregional instead 
an international level, assuming that the local input is "administration". 
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Trying to have the best possible prospects for the relevance of the questions we 
ask and the existence of sufficient data, we attempt to investigate within the 
European Union, between 2003 and 2011. European Union is implementing an 
extensive decentralization effort, seeking to improve its financial performance. Also, 
member countries have redistributive policies in order to address regional disparities 
through state budget (Patonov, 2013). So, considering at first accessibility to 
regional data and secondly, the European debate around inequality and 
redistribution of GDP makes this study interesting and feasible. 
But, does the phenomenon of concentration of income really exist? According to 
the table below, it does. 
Table 1. Statistical Analysis of income decentralization (country level) 
Mean 0.625253 
Max 1.080000 
Min 0.280000 
St. Deviation 0.193951 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
As it becomes evident, since average income ratio of each region to the capital of its 
country is 0.62, the countries' capitals have a clear income favor. Indeed, the country 
which has the highest decentralization in comparison with the respective capital 
reveals superiority of the periphery over the capital reaching the level of 1.08, while 
the less decentralized has an average equal to 0.28. It is important to determine that 
when this index becomes equal to the unit, it shows absolute equality of capital 
income and the income of other regions. 
Thus, on the one hand, it becomes clear that the issue which we discuss exists and 
moreover, it happens extendedly. Whether it can be explained by some 
characteristics of countries is a question which remains. 
3.2 Possibility and necessity of determining this relationship 
The best way to study how does international economy work, is to start by 
examining what happens inside the nations. (Krugman 1991: 3 as cited in Balisacan 
et al. 2006). 
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Following this logic, most countries, including economically developed, face 
regional inequalities. For this reason, they practice strategies and policies for 
regional development. So, it is imperative to study the progress of convergence and 
to identify those entities which cause inequality (for example capital cities) in extend 
of the measurement of inequality alone. 
Regarding the possibility of determining this relationship, we have to face, and 
basically to accept, a series of limitations, because of our weakness to use a precise 
and undeniable measure for our basic explanatory variable, decentralization of 
administration. We will use measures that have been accepted in previous studies, 
not failing to emphasize their weaknesses. 
Another obstacle is the innovative dependent variable, which raises questions as 
to its relevance to other independent variables. The variables selection is based on 
earlier literature. At the same time, we know that European Union exerts an 
unprecedented effort of economic convergence of European countries, in terms of 
per capita GDP, which hardly leaves unaffected the internal breakdown of GDP in 
each country. However, the investigation of this effect exceeds the limits of this 
work. 
3.3 The relationship between growth and decentralization 
(regionalization) and concentration (federalism EU) processes 
Many countries around the world have started to delegate more and more 
powers to sub-national jurisdictions. Belgium, for example, became a federal state in 
1993. An example of a trend in the opposite direction is the European Union, which 
gathers an increasing portion of responsibility, reducing the autonomy of its member 
states (Lessmann 2011).3 
What is considered necessary for fiscal federalism is the constructive 
relationship between public authorities at different levels, which is the economic 
participation of the one being at the highest level, in order to support, if necessary, 
the authorities of lower levels. In this respect, an analogy can be used between 
"national" and "international" fiscal federalism, the latter being associated with the 
relationship between national and supranational authorities or international 
organizations (in international economics) (Oprea 2010). 
                                                 
3 Brexit has not been considered in this paper.  
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4. Model - Method 
4.1. Selection of variables (definition and evaluation of choices) 
In this research, we attempt to manage a dependent variable for which, to our 
knowledge, there has been no previous reference and, in particular, a relevant 
econometric model. Thus, we sought the best possible foundation, hoping that any 
failures and obstacles encountered will not make useful conclusions prohibitive. 
As a dependent variable we will use some concepts of decentralization of per 
capita GDP. So, we try to adapt to the logic of decentralization variables which have 
been used, so far, to describe the inequality in per capita GDP. 
As such, we firstly look at the average of the ratio of per capita GDP of each 
region to per capita GDP of the capital. This variable occurs as a paraphrase of the 
variable used to measure inequality in literature (Balisacan et al. 2006) and in which 
the denominator is the average of per capita GDP at a country level (instead of 
capital). So, we create data per country.4  
Explanatory variables that we use, are mainly derived of models which describe 
the relationship between decentralization of administration and regional inequality, 
while the decentralization variables derive from models which consider them as 
dependent (Lessmann 2011 and Pike et. al. 2011). 
Regarding the basic explanatory variable, decentralization of administration, 
literature is extensive but it does not lead to specific conclusions as to the correct 
approach. Many use subnational spending as a proxy, while others use subnational 
revenue as a percentage of GDP, supporting that the latter is preferred to declare 
independence from transfers (Balisacan et al. 2006 and Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez 
2013 and Afonso & Hauptmeier 2009, Pike et al. 2011, Gyorgy & Campeanu 2009). 
Using the costs also ensures better comparability of the results with those of 
previous studies, since some scientists use both revenues and expenditure, while 
others only use expenditure. Also, as Wallis and Oates (1988) point out, measures 
of expenditure decentralization tend to be more stable over time in relationship to 
measures of decentralization of revenue (Freinkman & Plekhanov 2005). 
                                                 
4 From now on it will be referred as “Y”. 
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Some completely ignore financial matters and think decentralization only in 
terms of local electoral system, and designers often focus solely on developing 
methods of transferring sources to local levels. The "one-dimensional" approach is 
not likely to be viable or to produce successful decentralization (Bahl & Martinez-
Vazquez 2013). 
Another decentralization variable is the quality of local governance (Balisacan et 
al. 2006), however, absence of a clear measure becomes a restriction. 
Another variable that we used, considering that it is related to income 
inequalities was per capita country income (Freinkman & Plekhanov 2005). 
Additionally, several studies (1997 InterAmerican Development Bank, Cerniglia, 
2003; Arzaghi & Henderson, 2005 as cited in Lessmann 2011) confirmed that a 
formal federal structure helps the increase of fiscal decentralization. Overall, the 
share of subnational expenditure in total government spending, is higher in federal 
countries, but some non-federal countries, also have a high level of decentralized 
expenditure, while the distinction between federal and non-federal constitutions do 
not appear to reflect two compact groups (Lessmann 2011). 
In relation to decentralization, the costs and loss of efficiency, the potential 
inability of regions to internalize positive and negative effects of the policies of 
neighboring regions is highlighted. Undoubtedly, the extent of these effects will be 
lower in larger states (Freinkman & Plekhanov 2005). We use, for this reason, a 
variable describing the population of countries. 
Finally, we test a possible association of inequality at country level (through 
dispersion of Eurostat variable) with our dependent variable but it fails. 
Then, we will give some general characteristics of the variables we use. Initially, 
we used Eurostat as a source and as a sub-national entity NUTS2 was taken, as 
Eurostat defines it. There are some outliers and also possible sensitivity of the 
results to the administrative limits selected (Balisacan et al 2006), which makes it 
interesting to additionally investigate NUTS35 level too.  
Moreover, in literature appear doubts about the meaning of regional inequality, 
as intra-regional inequality explains much of the variation in incomes of households 
nationally (Balisacan 2003), while another problem is that the relationship between 
                                                 
5 Which, besides, exceeds the narrow limits of this paper. 
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the central and subnational governments vary through countries (Eyraud et al. 
2012).  
Table 2. Variables, Definitions and Stationarity 
Variable Definitions Stationarity 
Y (Authors’ Calculations from 
Eurostat 2014) 
 
Stationary 
EMU (Authors’ Calculations from 
Europa 2014) 
Binomial, 1 if country uses Euro - 
Subnational to National expenditure 
ratio (Authors’ Calculations from 
Eurostat 2014) 
Subnational Government expenditure/Central 
Government expenditure  
Stationary 
General Government expenditure  
(Eurostat 2014) 
General Government expenditure  as %GDP Stationary 
General Government Revenue  
(Eurostat 2014) 
General Government Revenue  as %GDP Stationary 
Subnational Government Revenue 
(Eurostat 2014) 
Subnational Government Revenue as %GDP Stationary 
Πληθυσμός (Eurostat 2014) Country Population Stationary 
Number of Regions (Authors’ 
Calculations from Eurostat 2014) 
Number of Regions  - 
Source: Authors’ Calculations  
 
4.2. Econometric model and results 
In our analysis we will use a state and time-series panel, testing some different 
specializations. Panels seem adequate, given that the countries in the European 
Union are significantly interdependent and their economic synchronization is intense 
(Afonso & Hauptmeier 2009). The specifications we use derive ideas from 
independent variables used in models relating regional income inequality (rather 
than decentralization) to decentralization, such as Lessmann (2011) and Pike et al. 
(2011). 
In all analyses we use panel regression with least squares method, through 
Eviews8. Finally, we ran heteroskedasticity tests by BPG method. 
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Keeping these in mind, we examine the relationship between decentralization of 
income per capita and decentralization of administration, in the following model: 
Table 3. Regression results 
Variable OLS FE RE Stationarity6 
Y (Dependent)    0.0000 
C -0.140795 
(0.2171) 
-0.169742 
(0.1511) 
-0.140795 
(0.2234) 
 
Pop_Country 
6.31E-06 
(0.0002) 
6.44E-06 
(0.0002) 
6.31E-06 
(0.0003) 
0.0000 
EMU 
0.113578 
(0.0000) 
0.114116 
(0.0000) 
0.113578 
(0.0000) 
 
General_rev 
0.012167 
(0.0001) 
0.011301 
(0.0012) 
0.012167 
(0.0001) 
0.0000 
Noncentral_rev 
0.009410 
(0.0057) 
0.010959 
(0.0051) 
0.009410 
(0.0064) 
0.0000 
General_exp 
-0.032085 
(0.0000) 
-0.032615 
(0.0000) 
-0.032085 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
EXPP 
0.565126 
(0.0000) 
0.572744 
(0.0000) 
0.565126 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
N 
-0.020921 
(0.0000) 
-0.021342 
(0.0000) 
-0.020921 
(0.0000) 
 
     
R-squared 0.446954 0.455423 0.446954  
F statistic 
21.93599 
(0.000000) 
10.14696 
(0.000000) 
  
     
FE-F test  P=0.9431   
Hausman test   P=0.9056  
BPG Test 0.057718 0.425437 0.057718  
               Source: Authors’ Calculations  
 
Αs table 3 imposes, Fixed effects model is clearly preferable to simple OLS (in F- 
test), while Hausman test highlights Random effects method as the best, but it 
slightly differs from OLS so they would be dealt, essentially, together. Further, FE 
model contains homoskedasticity for a = 0.01, 0.05, 0.1. On the opposite side, both 
of the two other models are homoskedastic only while a = 0.01, 0.05. Therefore, all 
three models are presented in order to prove the results’ robustness. 
                                                 
6 Common root Levin, Lin & Chu 
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5. Results Interpretation 
5.1. Model annotation and variable correlation determination 
The models presented above show a strong correlation between the dependent 
variable and the explaining ones. Of course, constant is not statistically significant, 
interpretative power of the model is quite high, since R2 fluctuate between 44% and 
45%. 
 
Variables that remain significant after successive regression specifications are very 
likely to actually be strongly correlated with the dependent variable. As shown, these 
are: 
 EMU: Eurozone countries seem to be more decentralized, by an income 
perspective, than other countries, having a considerable variation (0.1141 in 
OLS and 0.1136 FE). 
 Subnational to national expenditure ratio: the share of subnational spending 
relative to that of central government (administration decentralization 
measure) is positively correlated with income decentralization. 
 General government expenditure: it indicates that the presence of public 
(general government’s) expenditure, as a percentage of GDP has a 
statistically significant and marginally negative effect. 
 General government revenue: this has a marginally positive impact on 
decentralization of income. 
 Population: Larger, in population, countries seem to have slightly stronger 
decentralization than others. 
 Subnational governments’ revenue: The larger subnational governments’ 
revenue is, the stronger is economic decentralization they achieve. 
 Finally, a significant negative effect of the number of a country's regions in the 
decentralization of income is detected. 
 
5.2. Reliability tests results 
A parameter which makes the analysis more complicated and drawing 
conclusions less safe is the inevitable use of a panel of non-normal (but stationary) 
time series cross section. However, usual problems of heteroskedasticity and 
 16 
 
doubtful, as to their significance, variables are not being observed. The problems 
this model suffers are non-normality of residuals and the ambiguity of the 
relationship of each variable that is used to approximate decentralization of 
administration (if there is one decentralization of administration form) to the 
dependent (due to the different approaches that have been proposed to measure it). 
 
5.3. Variables deficiency and econometric gaps 
Regarding econometric gaps, rather problems arising are mainly such that they 
cannot be handled (such non normality), and so, the presentation provided seems 
effective enough. In relation to the variables, it would be more likely to a reader to be 
more thoughtful to their overabundance, despite the shortcomings. We distinguish 
many variables which approach different aspects (or kinds or forms) of the 
widespread concept of decentralization of administration, while we also tested 
variables related to administration in general (decentralized or not). This 
phenomenon hides the danger of over-specification and of dangerous interaction 
between independent variables. 
6. Policy Implications 
It is of great importance to achieve an understanding of the impact that 
politics and politic systems have on civilian’s income. Moreover, it becomes clear 
that the distribution of income is of first priority to European institutions and even 
more European regional policy. But, even more important and practically useful is 
using such knowledge in order to set the bases and implement policies that improve 
income and income distribution indexes. 
Our research results have a clear and specific message to deliver. Except a 
few countries in European Union, there exist an important income gap between their 
capital’s region and other regions. By this point of view, spatial and geographical 
deviations become of secondary importance. It is highlighted that governance and 
(non)decentralization of decision making creates an income gap that seems to be 
way in favor of the capitals and usually unfavorable to other regions. This way, 
decision making becomes more, or at least equally, important such as geography or 
nature, history and environment. The crucial difference is that policies can be easily 
changed by right decisions. 
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What we believe that could be helpful, is to consider regionalization as a 
policy against income inequality, and especially income decentralization. Thus, 
politicians should be much more positive when it comes to implementing such 
policies. Income inequality becomes a situation that is over geography, 
transportations, culture, or even fertility. Through this paper, it also becomes a 
decision making distribution side-effect.  
According to that perspective, administrative decentralization is a strong 
instrument that seems to heel such differences and inequalities. Such results show 
that administrative decentralization and especially revenue decentralization can be 
the appropriate policy, in order to make income decentralization a matter of less 
intensity. In our opinion, the most important conclusion that should be extracted of 
this research is the ability of administrative distribution between decentralized and 
central governments to change income distribution between the provinces and 
capital regions. 
7. Conclusions - Suggestions 
In conclusion, we present a possible relationship that may exist between 
decentralization of per capita GDP and decentralization of administration. Searching 
literature support, we were unable to find any straight references, but enough 
evidence that suggest or render feasible and reasonable such a relationship. In a 
statistical analysis, we determine the issue and analyze its strong existence. 
Through an econometric model, we bring to light a strong relationship between 
income decentralization of subnational entities at NUTS 2 level and explanatory 
variables used as decentralization of administration approaches. As main variable, 
subnational spending to central government ratio, acts positively on decentralization 
of income in all our specifications. 
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